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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and order of commitment entered upon a 
conviction of domestic violence, I.C. §§ 18-903, 918(2), with an enhancement for being a 
persistent violator, I.C. § 19-2514. R 127-130,138-143. Mr. Fordyce's convictions should be 
vacated because objected to prejudicial evidence was admitted without any IRE 403 analysis and 
because objected to irrelevant expert testimony was admitted. 
B. Procedural History 
Mr. Fordyce was charged by information with domestic violence. The State further 
alleged persistent violator status. R 29-30,35-37. Following a jury trial, Mr. Fordyce was 
convicted and sentenced to a term of fifteen years, with the first four years fixed and the 
remaining eleven years indeterminate, to be served concurrently with any other sentence being 
served. All fines, fees, and costs were waived, but restitution was imposed. R 127-130. This 
appeal timely followed. R 134-136. 
C. Statement of Facts 
In the early hours of May 24, 2008, Nicole Ford, extremely intoxicated, naked, and with 
blood on her face, knocked on a neighbor's door, and the police were summoned. She was 
behaving irrationally, and screaming either "Please help me. Please help me. I don't want him to 
get a hold of me" or "Help me. Help me. My husband is going to get me. My husband is going 
to kill me." The neighbor testified both ways. Tr. p. 181, In. 13 - p. 183, In. 11, p. 191, In. 8 -
10. 
The police and paramedics arrived and Ms. Ford was taken to the emergency room. 
During the trip, her nose bled. According to the officer who escorted Ms. Ford to the hospital, 
she was hysterical and combative, and some of what she was saying was not coherent. The 
officer testified that Ms. Ford said someone was going to kill her and the officer assumed that 
Ms. Ford was referring to Mr. Fordyce. Ms. Ford was also concerned that she would get into 
legal trouble herself. Tr. p. 322, In. 3 - 8, p. 324, In. 4 - 25, p. 332, In. 3, p. 333, In. 5 - 12. 
Another officer testified that Ms. Ford referred to "Boots" and he knew that "Boots" was Mr. 
Fordyce's nickname. 
According to the doctor who treated her, Ms. Ford was "psychomotor agitated, angry, 
crying, yelling, disheveled, and intoxicated." Tr. p. 208, In. 24- p. 209, In. 3. She had some 
bruises on the face. Tr. 209, In. 6-12. However, there were no broken bones. Tr. 216, In. 20-21. 
According to the treating nurse, Ms. Ford had dried blood on her face, but it was not 
apparent where the blood came from. Ms. Ford was difficult to work with, did not want 
treatment, and was irritated and agitated. She also volunteered that she had been beaten by her 
live-in boyfriend. Tr. p. p. 236, In. 6 - 8, p. 238, In. 7 - p. 240, In. II. 
The hospital performed a pregnancy test which came back positive. The pregnancy test 
resulted in a number score. A number of less than 2 means the woman is not pregnant. A 
number above 2 indicates pregnancy. However, a level below 1000 indicates a very early 
pregnancy, one which has not implanted so as to be visible on a sonogram and may not even be a 
viable pregnancy. Ms. Ford's test result was 64, well below 1000, and, as the doctor testified, 
"We did a sonogram to look for the baby. And, from my memory there was no baby." Tr. p. 
212, In. 12 - p. 213, In. 6, p. 214, In. 2 - p. 215, In. 15. 
The police went to the house Mr. Fordyce shared with Ms. Ford. Mr. Fordyce was found 
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sitting in a closet amongst his children's toys. He was cooperative with the police and was 
arrested. Upon his arrest, Mr. Fordyce had a bite wound on his thumb which was treated at the 
jail for several days to prevent infection. Tr. p. 416, In. 3-6, p. 444 In. 3 - p. 445, In. 4, p.650, In. 
18 - p. 651, In. 20. 
Another person in the house, Mr. Fordyce's son, Joshua, also had a cut on his hand that 
night. While there was blood in several areas in the house, the State presented no evidence that it 
ever tested the blood to determine whether it came from Ms. Ford, Mr. Fordyce, or his son. Tr. 
p. 508, In. 12 - 511, In. 6. 
From this point, the State's version of the events varies from that presented by the 
defense. 
According to the State's theory, built on evidence of prior bad acts, expert testimony 
about the scope ofthe domestic violence problem in general and the character traits of victims, 
and Ms. Ford's statements at the neighbor's, in the ambulance, and at the hospital, made while 
she was highly intoxicated, hysterical, combative, and sometimes incoherent, Mr. Fordyce was 
guilty of domestic violence against Ms. Ford. The State's theory was that Mr. Fordyce was upset 
because he believed that Ms. Ford might be pregnant as a result of a rape that had occurred 
approximately a month earlier and that this motivated him to commit battery on her. The 
prosecutor argued that Mr. Fordyce tried to kick Ms. Ford in the stomach because of this 
pregnancy. Tr. p. 669, In. 4 - p. 689, In. 11. 
To prove its case the State presented the testimony of Ms. Ford. Ms. Ford testified that 
she sustained some injuries on May 23 or 24, and confirmed that she had made statements to the 
paramedics and the doctor that her boyfriend/old man hit her. Tr. p. 261, In. 22 - p. 266, In. 16. 
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Ms. Ford testified on cross-examination to a difTerent theory of the case. And, to 
impeach her testimony, the State presented, without objection, evidence from Ms. Ford's mother 
about a prior incident. Tr. p. 303, In. 14 - p. 304, In. 23. Ms. Ford's mother, Kim May, testified 
that in April or May of 2007, she was present when her daughter carne flying through a glass 
door causing shards of glass to go everywhere. While Ms. May did not see Mr. Fordyce push her 
daughter through the door, she did hear him yelling. Tr. p. 347, In. 7 - p. 351, In. 2. 
Lastly, the State's case relied upon expert testimony about domestic violence which will 
be discussed at length below. Tr. p. 458-478. 
The defense was based on testimony of Ms. Ford, Joshua Fordyce, who was present in the 
house, and Mr. Fordyce. The evidence established that Ms. Ford was having a 
nightmare/flashback about the prior rape. Mr. Fordyce went in to comfort her. Ms. Ford, 
erroneously believing that the man who had raped her was in her room, lashed out at Mr. Fordyce 
and bit his thumb. Ms. Ford then ran away, falling twice on her way out of the room and again in 
an empty irrigation ditch. Ms. Ford's initial failure to explain to the police and medical 
personnel what had happened was a result of her intoxicated, medicated, and hysterical status 
combined with her post-traumatic stress and her fear that she would again be arrested either for 
public intoxication or another case of domestic violence against Mr. Fordyce. Tr. p. 689, In. 14 -
p. 707, In. 13. 
Ms. Ford testified that she and Mr. Fordyce were engaged and lived together. Ms. Ford is 
a recovering drug addict and struggles with alcohol. She also has diabetes, bi-polar disorder, 
depression, and PTSD. The PTSD causes insomnia and severe nightmares. Tr. p. 249, In. 12 - p. 
250, In. 2, p. 255, In. 3 - 8, p. 271, In. 9 - 19, p. 287, In. 23 - p. 288, In. 5. 
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In April 2008, she was raped. She had been given a morning after pill at that time, but on 
May 24, her period was late. That day, she and Mr. Fordyce discussed going out to celebrate a 
friend's birthday, and Mr. Fordyce was concerned about how her drinking could affect a baby if 
she was pregnant. However, it was not a heated discussion and they went out and had a nice 
evening. Tr. p. 259, In. 4 - 12, p. 272, In. 4 - p. 273, In. 21, p. 283, In. 18 - 23. 
Ms. Ford drank very heavily that night and also took Seroquel, a prescription sleeping 
medication, and Norco, a prescription anti-depressant. In the past, this type of drinking, 
combined with medication and her diabetes had caused her to pass out and put her in danger of a 
diabetic coma. When they got home, Ms. Ford was very drunk and sick. She took off her 
clothes and left them on the kitchen floor to wash the next day. She threw up a couple of times, 
and Mr. Fordyce got her a bucket and helped her to bed. Tr. p. 270, In. 1 - 14, p. 274, In. 4 - 21, 
p. 292, In. 18 - p. 293, In. 1. 
Later in the night, Ms. Ford thought that the man who had raped her was in her room and 
she began to hit and kick and bite. She bit his thumb. During this, she lost her balance and fell 
off the bed into the area between the bed and the wall. When she tried to get up, she fell again. 
Then she fled the house running through back yards. As she ran, she fell off the porch and then 
later fell into an empty irrigation ditch. These falls caused her injuries. Tr. p. 275, In. 7 - p. 276, 
In. 10, p. 280 - p. 281, In. 10. 
She went to the neighbor's and while she was there, she realized what had happened. She 
tried to leave, but they would not let her. Then at the hospital, she still wanted to leave, but again 
she could not; they even threatened to tie her to the bed. Tr. p. 276, In. 25 - p. 279, In. 8. 
She was in a drunken haze that night. Additionally, once she was at the hospital, Haldol 
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and Ativan were added to the mix of drugs and alcohol in her system. On top of everything else, 
she was afraid that she would be arrested for being outside drunk and naked. Also, she had a 
prior arrest for domestic battery against Mr. Fordyce, which added to her anxiety that she might 
be arrested. Tr. p. 268, In. 6 - 8, p. 274, In. 14 - 17, p. 286, In. 12 - 13, p. 287, In. 2 - 7, p. 291, In. 
21 - 23, p. 293, In. 20 - 24. 
She was referring to the man who had raped her when she made statements about being 
hit and thinking that someone was going to kill her. She did know that the man who had raped 
her was in jail, but he had friends on the outside and she was afraid. She did not tell anyone that 
this was a rape flashback that night. Tr. p. 289, In. 2 - 5, p. 278, In. 18 - 20, p. 300, In. 22 - p. 
301, In. 14. 
Nor did she tell the officer who came to photograph her the next morning about the 
flashback. She refused to be photographed or to write out a statement, but she made a verbal 
statement that she did not want to put anyone else in prison and that "he is going to kill me 
because he fucked up ... " She also made statements that she was afraid that Mr. Fordyce would 
leave her and that she could not take care of herself or survive ifhe did that. Tr. p. 308, In. 16 -
p. 309, In. 16. 
Ms. Ford's testimony was consistent with that of Joshua Douchette, Mr. Fordyce's son. 
Joshua testified that he was living with Mr. Fordyce and Ms. Ford on May 23,2008. That night, 
he and his girlfriend babysat the other children in the home while Mr. Fordyce and Ms. Ford and 
some other friends went out. Tr. 506, In. 1 - p. 507, In. 25. 
During the evening, 16-year-old Joshua and his girlfriend had an argument, and he went 
outside and punched the garage wall. He injured his hand and it bled. Blood from the wound 
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was in the living room, kitchen and bathroom, and on the patio. He and his girlfriend tried to 
clean up, but a lot of blood was left. Tr. p. 508, In. 12 - p. 511, In. 6. 
After Ms. Ford was in bed, Joshua was in the bathroom across the hall cleaning his injury. 
He could hear Ms. Ford making some noise in her sleep and heard his father talking to her. 
Then, he heard his father groan in pain and saw him trying unsuccessfully to move his arm. He 
could not see exactly what had happened. Tr. p. 511, In. 4 - p. 514, In. 16. 
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Ford came out of the bedroom. She was naked and yelling at 
Joshua's girlfriend saying something was all her fault. She was not injured and did not have 
blood on her except for a little bloody nose. She sat down and mumbled without making any 
sense. Tr. p. 516, In. 16 - p. 518, In. 10, p. 537, In. 6 - 12, p. 559, In. 6 - 7. 
Joshua's girlfriend gave Ms. Ford a towel to cover herself. Then, Ms. Ford suddenly 
threw off the towel and ran out of the house. Tr. p. 518, In. 16 - 24. 
Mr. Fordyce testified that they had gone out with friends and that Ms. Ford was drunk. 
She did not feel well and he got her a bucket and helped her to bed in the room they shared with 
his 17-month old twins. Then he returned to the kitchen and made food for everyone else. Tr. p. 
586, In. 22 - p. 589, In. 3, p. 591, In. 17 - p. 592, In. 3. 
Later, while he was watching TV, he heard Ms. Ford having a nightmare. He went into 
the room to comfort her and started caressing her cheek and telling her that it was okay. This 
made Ms. Ford more fitful and suddenly she lashed out and bit his thumb. He tried to yank his 
hand back, but she kicked and hit and would not let go. Finally, he was able to get his thumb out 
of her mouth and she fell backwards into the crack between the bed and the wall. She was very 
angry then and he stepped to the side. She fell once again because she was so drunk. Tr. p. 589, 
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In. 8 - 16, p. 592, In. 11 596, In. 1. 
He laid across the bed and she kicked him in the testicles and then left the room. His 
thumb was bleeding. Tr. p. 596, In. 5 - 8, p. 598, In. 4. 
He did not follow her out of the bedroom. Later, his son said that the police were there. 
He went to check on his four-year-old in another room, sawall the police lights, and not wanting 
to surprise the police and seeing the open closet, he just sat down and waited. He didn't try to 
hide himself amongst the toys. A million things were going through his mind; he could not 
believe what was happening. When the police asked him about blood being on Ms. Ford, he said 
it was probably from him, meaning that blood from his thumb was probably on her. Tr. p. 598, 
In. 20 - p. 600, In. 14, p. 604, In. 18 - p. 605, In. 2. 
One of the officers who arrested Mr. Fordyce confirmed that blood was pooling in his 
hand from the thumb bite at the time he was arrested. Tr. p. 415, In. 1 - p. 416, In. 6. 
D. Facts Relevant to Issues on Appeal 
1. Evidence as to Pregnancy 
Prior to trial, the defense moved to exclude evidence that Ms. Ford might have been 
pregnant on May 24. The evidence would be highly prejudicial because it was expected that the 
State would bring in evidence that Ms. Ford had accused Mr. Fordyce of trying to kick her in the 
stomach. It would further be highly prejudicial because Ms. Ford later either had a miscarriage 
or was never pregnant. Tr. p. 22, In. 13 - p. 24, In. 6. The State responded that the evidence was 
probative and not unfairly prejudicial because the State believed that the pregnancy proved 
motive. Tr. p. 25, In. 6 - 12. The District Court made the following ruling, which did not 
include any analysis under IRE 403: 
8 
Well, it appears to me based upon the Idaho Rules of Evidence that this is an 
admissible statement for the purpose of motive. Clearly the - there may be a 
difference in the testimony as to whether or not this was mentioned or was a cause 
of the fight that occurred between the two. But the State has its right to its theory 
of the case just as the Defense has its right to its theory of the case. 
And, in this particular case, apparently the victim of this - the alleged victim in 
this case has indicated that the fight started because they got into an argument 
with regard to the fact that she might well be pregnant. That when she went to the 
hospital she was in fact treated. That she gave the statements at the hospital for 
the purpose of obtaining medical treatment, which of course takes it outside of the 
hearsay rule, and so the Court will allow the testimony. 
Obviously, I will allow the Defense to put on testimony in opposition to the 
State's theory of the case. But where it goes directly to an issue of motive, clearly 
all rulings prior to the trial itself in the nature of a motion in limine, the Court will 
note that this isn't a formal motion in limine because it was not filed prior to the 
period of time for such a motion. It is more of a head's up to the Court. The 
Court will obviously consider what the foundational testimony is and make a 
determination as to whether or not it should be admissible at that time. 
But, generally, motive, it is introducible to show motive. Clearly, the Defense 
may fashion a limiting instruction, if it wishes the Court to give a limiting 
instruction. It has every right to it. 
Tr. p. 28, In. 12 - p. 29, In. 25. 
The evidence was admitted without further discussion and a limiting instruction was 
gIven. Tr. p. 212, In. 7 - p. 215, In. 15. R 91V. 
2. Expert Testimony Regarding Domestic Violence 
The State's final witness was Detective Rick Boyes, who testified as an expert regarding 
domestic violence. He began his testimony with the following: 
First of all, just to put things in perspective, this is a huge problem in the United 
States. In the time period that you will spend sitting in court today, on the average 
four women will be killed by their intimate partner. More women are injured 
through domestic violence incidents than are injured in car accidents, rapes, and 
stranger initiated muggings or attacks combined. It is a huge problem. 
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And domestic violence has no one face, but most studies indicate that between 90 
and 95 percent of the victims are generally women. IfI may, I will talk a little bit 
about the cyclical nature of domestic violence. 
Domestic violence relationship a domestically violent relationship is not 
constantly violent. It tends to go through cycles. Several models have been put 
forth to help people understand this. The most common ones talk about sort of a 
tension building phase in which the behaviors of the victim or soon-to-be victim 
are sort of described as walking on eggshells, trying to placate the potential 
abuser, knowing intimately how to try to keep things on as even a keel as possible 
but with a growing sense of tension. And then there will be a crisis that involves 
some type of physical abuse. Verbal abuse and emotional abuse usually continues 
through all of these cycles. 
After the portion of the cycle where there is physical violence, there is usually a 
calming down period, a make-up period, lots of promises for never continuing this 
behavior, getting help, stopping drinking, all these kinds of things that may play 
in. Unfortunately the cycle then tends to continue over time. So one of the 
hardest things to understand for people outside of these relationships is how 
someone would get into a relationship like that. 
And it is important to understand that if on the first night of the first date between 
a couple instead of leaning over for the goodnight kiss, he were to punch her in 
the face, I think it's safe to say there would probably never be a second date in 
most every situation. But things don't start out that way. 
Behaviors that would be noticeable by a therapist or someone with experience in 
those kinds of dynamics would see some of the initial protectiveness and decision-
making and controlling of small issues of power from where they go on their date 
to what they order to what she wears. All of these things are often taken as simply 
caring, protectiveness. Jealously is mistaken for love. There's a saying that you 
boil a live frog by putting it in cool water and turning it up one degree at a time. 
And that's what generally happens in these relationships. It's a shift over a period 
of time. The main dynamics being those of power. 
Tr. p. 462, In. 18 - p. 465, In. 2. 
Defense counsel objected to this testimony on relevancy grounds. However, the Court 
denied the objection. Tr. p. 465, In. 4 - 8. 
At that point, the State asked the expert to explain why victims of domestic violence 
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don't always report. In response, the expert testified that failure to report is extremely common 
and can be based in finances, the fear of losing a dream, and the hope that things will get better. 
He also testified that the most dangerous time for a woman in a violent relationship is when she 
attempts to leave, that this is the time of the highest number of injuries and homicides by the 
intimate partners. Tr. p. 465, In. 15 - p. 466, In. 6. 
Again, defense counsel objected. At this point, the Court called a recess. Tr. p. 466, In. 
10-22. 
The State asserted that the testimony was important to help the jury understand Ms. 
Ford's "minimizing and recanting." Tr. p. 467, In. 7 - 24. Defense counsel argued that given 
there was no specific evaluation done on Ms. Ford and there was nothing to relate to this specific 
incident, so the evidence was not relevant and was pushing the jury to believe that the situation 
before them was "exactly like the majority or as the statistics show." Tr. p. 468, In. 1 - 18. 
The Court stated that it understood the law to be that the expert could give general 
testimony, but could not say how it applies to the victim in the particular case unless they have 
treated or evaluated the victim. Tr. p. 469, In. 2 - 12. 
Defense counsel agreed with this, stating: 
That is correct, Honor. I obviously want to make sure that, you know, my client 
knows that there is everything that he wants to have done in regards to the 
evidence and explaining everything to him, I want to make sure that he feels 
comfortable that at least his opinion is at least voiced to the Court. And I 
understand the overruling, and I appreciate the Court allowing us to get into that. 
Tr. p. 469, In. 13 - 21.1 
1 Mr. Fordyce's counsel was suspended from the practice of law shortly after Mr. 
Fordyce's trial and before his sentencing. Tr. p. 741, In. 12 - 17. 
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The Court then stated that it would allow the expert to continue to talk in general about 
the patterns of domestic violence and about why witnesses recant. Tr. p. 469, In. 14 - p. 470, In. 
16. 
The expeli then testified to the phenomenon of recantation. Tr. p. 471, In. 15 - p. 472, In. 
21. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the abuse of discretion in failing to conduct the analysis required by IRE 403 
before admitting evidence that Ms. Ford was pregnant on May 24 require reversal? 
2. Does the erroneous admission of irrelevant expert testimony require reversal? 
3. Does cumulative error require reversal? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Failure to Conduct an Evidence Rule 403 Analysis was an Abuse of Discretion 
Which Requires Reversal 
Defense counsel moved to exclude evidence that Ms. Ford was pregnant on May 24 under 
IRE 403. The Court determined that the evidence was relevant to prove motive, but never 
conducted an IRE 403 analysis. This was an abuse of discretion that requires reversal. 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
IRE 403. 
Errors in the application of IRE 403 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Slale v. 
Meisler, 148 Idaho 236, 239, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009). In determining whether a trial court 
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has abused its discretion, this Court considers: 
(l) [W]hether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Slale v. Perry, 2010 Opinion No. 130, Slip Opinion, December 7, 2010, p. 8, citing Hall v. 
Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 319, 179 P.3d 276, 282 (2008) (quoting Sun 
Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v.Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993,1000 (1993). 
It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to fail to conduct a Rule 403 balancing analysis 
on the record. State v. Ruiz, 2010 Opinion 117, November 24, 2010, p. 4, "Because it excluded 
the evidence without conducting the analysis required by Rule 403, the district court erred." See 
also, State v. Meister, 148 Idaho at 241, 220 P .3d 1060, holding that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to apply IRE 403. See also, Dabestaini v. Bellus, 131 Idaho 542, 545, 961 
P.2d 633, 636 (1998), "In the trial court's conclusory statement in the written order, no reasoning 
is mentioned for the ruling concerning IRE 403. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in 
making this ruling." 
Because the defense objected to the error, this Court is to apply the harmless error test of 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,87 S.Ct. 824 (1967). State v. Perry, page 22. The State 
must demonstrate to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict. Id See also, State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 
923 (2010). 
The State's theory of this case was supported almost entirely by statements made when 
Ms. Ford was drunk, drugged, hysterical, incoherent, and behaving irrationally. While Ms. Ford 
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did have a bloody nose and bruises, the injuries were not more consistent with the State's theory 
of the case than with the defense theory. The only other evidence supporting the State's theory 
was the testimony of the expert on domestic violence. As will be explained below, much of that 
evidence should have also been excluded. 
Even though many people were in the house at the time of the events in question, the 
State did not have any testimony from anyone supporting the theory that Mr. Fordyce committed 
a battery. In contrast, the defense presented testimony not only of Ms. Ford, but also of Joshua 
and Mr. Fordyce, that demonstrated that there was not a battery. 
The pregnancy evidence was especially problematic because the jury may have speculated 
that the events of May 23 - May 24 resulted in a miscarriage. While the emergency room doctor 
did testifY that he could not see a baby on a sonogram, the jury was left to speculate that there 
may have been a viable pregnancy that was too early to be seen in a sonogram, but that had failed 
to result in a live birth. 
Under these facts, the State cannot demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have convicted Mr. Fordyce without the improperly admitted pregnancy evidence. 
Therefore, relief is appropriate. Chapman, supra. 
B. Reversible Error Occurred in the Admission ofIrrelevant Expert Testimony 
A new trial is required because of the erroneous admission of evidence of pregnancy. A 
new trial is also required because of the erroneous admission of expert testimony. 
Defense counsel objected to the expert testimony on domestic violence because the 
evidence was irrelevant. IRE 401, 402. 
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
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that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." IRE 401. While relevant evidence is admissible except as 
otherwise provided by the rules, evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. IRE 402. 
Further, even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. IRE 403. 
Relevance is a question of law subject to free review. State v. Truman, Slip Op., 
December 16,2010, p. 2; State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 954, 231 P.3d 1047 (Ct. App. 2010), 
"We review questions of relevance de novo." 
The State's expert testified at length over relevancy objections to what an enormous 
problem domestic violence is. The expert told the jury that while they were sitting in court, four 
women would be killed. The expert drew an analogy between women in domestically violent 
relationships and frogs being boiled alive. While domestic violence is a terrible problem, the 
scope of the problem and the number of women likely to be killed while the jury heard and 
deliberated Mr. Fordyce's case was completely irrelevant to the question of whether Mr. Fordyce 
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony domestic violence. IRE 402. State v. Ruiz, 
supra. 
Just as it would be an abuse of discretion to allow the State to close a possession with 
intent to deliver methamphetamine trial with expert testimony about the social and personal costs 
of methamphetamine use, it was an abuse of discretion to allow the State to close its case with 
expert testimony about the scope and horribleness of domestic violence. 
Clearly those parts of the expert testimony having to do with the scope and horror of the 
problem of domestic violence were completely irrelevant and should have been excluded. IRE 
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401,402. In addition, the remainder of the expert testimony was irrelevant. 
As the prosecutor told the Court, the State offered the expert testimony to explain why 
Ms. Ford recanted her original statements. Tr. p. 467, In. 7 - 25. The State was offering the 
expert testimony as evidence of the typical characteristics of domestic violence victims to 
support the conclusion that Ms. Ford was acting consistently with those characteristics when she 
recanted her original accusations. Such evidence is not relevant and is not admissible. State v. 
Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P .2d 27 (1988). 
Expert testimony, like all evidence, must be relevant to be admissible. State v. Hester, 
114 Idaho at 694,760 P.2d at 33; State v. Gong, 115 Idaho 86,87,764 P.2d 453, 454 (Ct. App. 
1986); State v. Fisher, 116 Idaho 978, 979, 783 P .2d 317, 318 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Idaho's appellate courts have not yet addressed whether expert testimony regarding traits 
exhibited by domestic abuse victims should be generally admissible to explain recantation by a 
State's witness. However, lessons can be drawn from the case law that exists concerning expert 
testimony about victims and perpetrators of child sex abuse. 
In child sex abuse cases, once a proper foundation has been laid, an expert may render an 
opinion about whether a child has been abused. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho at 692-93, 760 P.2d at 
31-32. And, if the defendant has attempted to impeach the credibility of a child witness by 
emphasizing the child's failure to promptly report an incident, expert testimony may be admitted 
to explain the delay. State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 154-55,730 P.2d 1069,1074-75 (Ct. 
App. 1986). See also, State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 709-10, 864 P.2d 149,155-56 (1993), 
holding that expert testimony regarding the manner in which abuse victims attempt to dissociate 
themselves from the abuse was admissible after the defendant attacked the victim's credibility by 
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cross-examining her about her testimony that the abuse was all a dream. See also, Slate v. Diggs, 
141 Idaho 303, ] 08 P.3d 1003 (Ct. App. 2005) (even without a direct challenge to the victim's 
credibility based on the delay in reporting, a jury may consider the absence of a prompt report of 
the crime as a factor that makes the victim less credible and therefore testimony explaining the 
delayed reporting would be relevant). 
However, Hester and Fisher make clear that if the expert testimony is offered simply to 
support the ultimate conclusion that someone acted in conformance with particular 
characteristics, the evidence is not relevant and none of the character evidence is admissible. 
State v. Hester, 114 Idaho at 694-95, 760 P.2d at 33-34; State v. Fisher, 116 Idaho at 979-80, 783 
P.2d at 318-19. 
In Hester, the State offered expert testimony regarding traits typically exhibited by 
abusers. The Supreme Court held that this evidence should not have been admitted. The Court 
wrote: 
If relevant, it is generally permissible for experts to testify regarding traits 
typically exhibited by child abusers. Likewise, evidence that Hester exhibits 
characteristics commonly found in child abusers would generally be admissible, if 
relevant. In addition, both types of evidence are "beyond [the] common 
experience" of most jurors, and jurors would be assisted by such expert testimony. 
However, IRE 404 prohibits the admission of evidence of a person's character 
(even ifin the form of an expert opinion) if offered in during the prosecution's 
case in chief to prove the accused's conduct on a specified occasion. The only 
reason for offering evidence that Hester exhibited character traits similar to those 
of known child abusers was to prove that he acted in conformance with those 
traits in this particular instance. It was not offered to rebut evidence "of a 
pertinent trial of his character offered by [the] accused," and thus does not meet 
the IRE 404(a)(I) exception. Using evidence of a person's characteristics in the 
prosecution's case in chief simply to support the ultimate conclusion that he acted 
in conformance with those characteristics in committing a crime, is not 
permissible. Under that scenario, the evidence of a person's characteristics is no 
longer relevant, and none of the character evidence is admissible. In the absence 
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of some other reason for the admission of this type of character evidence, besides 
that prohibited by IRE 404(a), evidence regarding the traits typically exhibited by 
child abusers is not admissible; neither is evidence that a particular defendant 
possesses those same characteristics admissible. 
State v. Hesler, supra (citations omitted). 
State v. Fisher applied Hester to a situation where the State offered expert testimony 
about the traits of child abusers purportedly to rebut testimony of another witness that Fisher was 
an honest person. The Court of Appeals reviewed the record and determined that the expert 
testimony was primarily aimed at showing that Fisher exhibited the characteristics of a familial 
sex abuse offender. Fisher states, "Regardless of when such testimony occurs, Hester clearly 
indicates that testimony regarding the similarity between an individual's traits and the general 
characteristics of sexual abuse offenders must be relevant in order to be admissible. Without the 
requisite introduction of character evidence by the defendant or by other defense witnesses, no 
such relevancy exists." 116 Idaho at 980, 783 P.2d at 319. 
In this case, the expert testimony was offered not about the defendant, but about the 
alleged victim. However, the rule on the admission of character evidence of an alleged victim is 
similar to the rule on the admission of character evidence of the accused. The rule states: 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(2) Character of the victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim 
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 




In this case, as in Hester and Fisher, the expert testimony was testimony about the traits 
of a specific group of people in Hester and Fisher, child abusers and in this case victims of 
domestic violence. In Hester and Fisher the evidence was offered to prove that the defendant 
had acted in confonnity with the general traits of child abusers in a particular instance. In this 
case, the expert testimony was offered to prove that Ms. Ford acted in confonnity with the 
general traits of victims of domestic abuse in a particular instance, specifically when she testified 
contrary to the State's theory that Mr. Fordyce was guilty. Just as in Hester and Fisher, the State 
offered this expert testimony in its case-in-chief. Yet, there was no requisite introduction of 
character evidence by the defense nothing in the defense cross-examination of Ms. Ford could 
be interpreted to be evidence that she was not testifYing truthfully to the best of her ability before 
the jury. Therefore, as in Hester and Fisher the evidence was not relevant and should not have 
been admitted. 
In this case, the State presented the irrelevant character evidence against its own witness. 
This distinguishes this case from Lawrence, Ransom and Diggs. In those cases, the expert 
testimony was used to bolster the credibility of the state's child witnesses to explain why the 
witnesses had delayed their accusations. In those cases, the State presented testimony from child 
witnesses that the State believed was credible and then offered the expert testimony to bolster the 
credibility after the child witnesses were impeached by the defense (or in the case of Diggs as a 
sort of pre-emptive bolstering). In this case, the State presented Ms. Ford as its witness. Then 
when she testified, as the State undoubtedly knew that she would, to a theory of the case contrary 
to the State's theory ofMr. Fordyce's guilt, the State presented its expert to testifY as to the traits 
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of victims of domestic violence, including the trait of recantation, to prove that Ms. Ford was 
acting consistently with the character of being a domestic violence victim when she gave her 
testimony before the jury. As stated in Fisher, without the requisite introduction of evidence by 
the defense as to Ms. Ford's character, the State's character evidence was inadmissible and "no .. 
. relevancy exists." 116 Idaho at 980, 783 P.2d at 319. 
Also, as with the pregnancy evidence, the Court failed to perform an IRE 403 analysis 
before admitting the expert testimony. This was an abuse of discretion. State v. Ruiz, supra; 
State v. Meister, supra; Dabestaini v. Bel/us, supra. 
As the defense objected to the expert testimony at trial, this court is to apply the harmless 
error test of Chapman v. California, supra, State v. Perry, page 22. The State must demonstrate 
to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury's 
verdict. Id See also, State v. Johnson, supra. 
As discussed above, the State's case was based upon statements made when Ms. Ford 
was drunk, drugged, hysterical, incoherent, and behaving irrationally. While the State presented 
evidence of injuries, the injuries were not more consistent with the State's theory of the case than 
with the defense theory. The only other evidence supporting the State's theory was the testimony 
of the expert on domestic violence. 
Even though many people were in the house at the time of the events in question, the 
State did not have any testimony from anyone supporting the theory that Mr. Fordyce committed 
a battery. In contrast, the defense did present testimony not only of Ms. Ford, but also of Joshua 
and Mr. Fordyce, that demonstrated that there was not a battery. 
Under these conditions, the erroneous admission of the expert testimony was not 
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harmless. Even if this Court finds only that the portions of the expert testimony about the scope 
and horror of the problem of domestic violence should have been excluded, the evidence of guilt 
was so insubstantial in this case that the State cannot demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the irrelevant and extremely prejudicial evidence did not contribute to the verdict. 
But, when this Court considers that not just the scope of the problem expert testimony, 
but all of the expert testimony should have been excluded, the conclusion that the error was not 
harmless is even stronger. Compare, State v. Fisher, supra, finding that the admission of expert 
testimony about the character traits of child abusers was not harmless. 
C. Cumulative Error Requires Relief 
Each of the evidentiary errors discussed above requires relief because neither error, even 
standing alone, was harmless. However, in addition, cumulative error requires relief. See State 
v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 686, 227 P.3d 933, 940 (Ct. App. 2010), "We need not determine 
whether each of the identified errors, standing alone, would have been harmless because an 
accumulation of irregularities, each of which might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate 
reveal the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due process." See 
also, State v. Truman, Slip Op. at p. 15. 
In this case, even if this Court finds that each error individually is harmless, the 
cumulative effect of the errors was to deny Mr. Fordyce a fair trial in contravention of his 
constitutional rights to due process. U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14, Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13. 
The State's case, without the improperly admitted evidence, was not sufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Fordyce was guilty of felony domestic violence. Therefore, 




For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Fordyce respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his convictions and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this ¢day of January, 2011. 
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